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RECORD CITATION" SY:JIBOLS
On the verso side of his table of contents page, the
Appellant has indicated the SYJ-nbols he used in citing
the various parts of the record on appeal. The Respondent "\v"i.ll conform to the same citation system in her brief,
which is as follows :
R-Record
S/R-Supplen1ental Record
OT-Original Transcript
T-Stipulated Transcript
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MARY GILCHRIST CURRY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
H. DONALD CURRY,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
D,ef enda;nt.

Case No.
8562

EXPLANATORY COMMENT AND
PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
Over a year ago the Respondent in this action filed
.a c·omplaint, as plaintiff, alleging grounds for and praying for a divorce from her husband, defendant below
and App·ellant here. Respondent alleged cruelty as the
ground for the divorce (R. 1). The Appellant filed an
Answer and a Counterclaim (R. 9). In his Answer Appellant denied Respondent's allegations of cruelty, but in
his Counterclaim he alleged that the Respondent h.ad
treated him cruelly and that if a divorce were granted
he had grounds therefore and prayed that it be granted
in his favor (R. 11). The Respondent filed a Reply
(R. 12).
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The action was tried to the Court, both parties
elieiting evidence in support of their allegations of
cruelty. At the conclusion of the evidence the Appellant
moved that the court grant him the divorce and custody
of the children (T. 57). The Court made findings of fact
and conclusions of law (R. 20-26) and entered its decree
(R. 27). The Court determined that each party had been
cruel to the other, but determined that the Appellant
\vas entitled to the divorce (R. 21, 24).
The Court awarded custody of the children to the
RPspondent subject to specified rights of visitation (R.
27) . The Court made a settlement of property interest~
and a\varded alimon·y· and support money (R. 28) pursuant to a stipulation thereon by the parties. The Court
specifically retained continuing jurisdiction regardless
of Respondent's residence (R. 30).
The .A--ppellant filed his X otiee of Appeal. The transcript of the eYidenee and proeeedings was prepared but
tbP Court and the attorneys concerned determined that
it "·a~ not satisfactorY in that it \Yas so inaccurate
that it co1npletely failed to reflect the testi1nony of the
"·itne~~<.)~. It \Yas agreed bet\Yeen the Court and the
partiP~ that .a stnten1ent of the evidence \vould be preparPd in liPu of the reporter~s transcript of the evidenee
(~/It 4~

5).

ThP attornt"\ys for the parties prepared and agreed

upon a na rra ti\"e stn te1nent of the evidence and stipulated
that it hP used on this appeal in .all particulars as the
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testimony of the witnesses in lieu of the reporter's transcript of the witnesses' testimony previously filed herein.
(See Stipulation Regarding Transcript, and the statement attached thereto.)
STATEMENT OF F AC'TS
Unfortunately the Respondent cannot adopt the Appellant's Statement of Facts as being correct. Appellant's
Statement of Facts is highly argumentive, and 1nuch of
the material contained therein is not supported by the
record before this court. The Appellant's Statement of
Facts is misleading in the following particulars : The
entire paragraph which begins at the bottom of page 2
of Appellant's Brief and continues well onto page 3
is without foundation in the Record and further it is
immaterial and improperly offered. Appellant's assertion
of fact on the same page that the vasectomy was performed upon "the request" and .approval of his wife
exceeds the bounds of the record. Appellant's statement
of fact that during periods of hospitalization Respondent "exhibited marked devotion" is also a gross exaggeration as the Stipulated Testimony at the citation given
by Appellant shows (T. 7, 13). Appellant's assertion of
fact, at page 5 of Appellant's Brief, that he went up
to Canada to bring back Re.spondent and their children
is unsupported by the record before this Court.
In lieu of Appellant's Statement of Fact, the Respondent offers the Explanatory Comment and Pro-
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cedural Statement in this Brief, supra, which covers
the procedural aspects of this case, and the following
concise resume of material facts deemed important to an
understanding of the i.ssues raised by this appeal:
Appellant and Respondent were married on December 15, 1945, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Appellant
was a United States citizen; Respondent resided in
Canada (T. 1). Appellant is a geologist and his work
has taken him to various parts of the United States,
Canada and Europe. The couple have resided in California, Wyoming, and Utah. They have four minor children who at the time of the commencement of this action
in January, 1956, ranged from two and one-half to seven
years of age. Evidence introduced at the trial to the
effect that the Plaintiff treated Re_spondent cruelly revolved in part around his religious attitude, his philosophy of life, and sexual demands. Evidence was introduced that the Respondent treated Appellant cruelly
in that she had transferred her affections to another.
In general eYidence "~as adduced tending to show that
the difficulties had been of long standing origin, arising
from the sexual de1nand_s of . .\.ppellant and troubles
caused thereby "~hieh had plagued their 1narriage long
prior to the asserted transferral of affections, although
the AppPllnnt tended to place the turning point at a
<·Prtnin dnte and to tie it in "'ith the ~Ir. HX" mentioned
in 1\ ppPllant's Brief. Ho,YeYer~ Appellant n1akes no
elain1 and there is no evidenee of any infidelity on the
part of respondent. The p.arties had sineerely but without sneec~~ engaged the aid of a 1narriage counselor.
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Appellant underwent a vasectomy operation in 1953
to try to remove one cau.se of discord (T. 5).
The Respondent submits to this Honorable Court
that the stipulated narrative statement of the evidence
contains all of the witnesses' testimony before the court
in this case, that the statement is relatively short and
that in place of a further extended discu.ssion of the
facts that the c·ourt be requested to refer to the stipulated statement, if it desires further expansion of the
evidence. However, the Respondent submits that this
ease can be sum1narily disposed of on a question of lavv
and that further resort to the facts may well be unnecess.ary.
STATE~iENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO ATTA·CK 'THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BECAUSE HE
COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING GROUNDS THEREFORE,
ELICITED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND AT
THE CLOSE OF THE TRIAL MOVED THE COURT TO
GRANT HIM THE DIVORCE.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT APPE~
LANT'S POINT I, THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT A DIVORCE SHOULD BE GRANTED, AND IF
THE COURT SEES FIT TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE
AWARDED TO APPELLANT AT HIS REQUEST IT IS
PROPER TO GRANT A DIVORCE IN RESPONDENT'S
FAVOR.
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POIN'T III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO ATTACK THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BECAUSE HE
COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING GROUNDS THEREFORE
ELICITED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND AT'
THE CLOSE OF THE TRIAL MOVED THE COURT TO
GRANT HIM THE DIVORCE.

Difficult as it is to determine the ..._~ppellant's rationale~ it seems that his argument is that the evidence
does not support the court's findings in his favor which
he requested in his pleadings, b~~ testimony elicited by
his counsel, ,,~hich he in·n.ted by his theor~~ of the case
at trial and by his reliance upon his counterclaim, and
he further argues that there is insufficient endence
to support the a'rard 1nade at Iris instance in his favor,
and that there is not enough evidence to support a
diy·orce for R.espondent and thus the decree should be
Y.a en t Pd. I Ie thn8 asks this Court to allow hiln to do
a ron1pleh• .. about-face .. on appeal.
In his conntt•rclainl the . .A.ppellnnt alleged as ground8
for n d i yo reP that 11 is "·ife had treated hiin eruelly..A.t
the trial h<\ brought forth br questions asked by his
o\vn coHHsPl tht• tt\stinionr needed to support his alleg-ation (T . ..t-, 5). The questioning of Respondent by
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Appellant'.s counsel with reference to :11:r. Alex ~1c
Doug.ald was for this purpose-it could have had no
other purpose (T. 4). It is a bit late now for the Ap·pellant to say that he did not desire the relief he prayed
for and which was granted him.
The Appellant has introduced by way of his brief
matters not properly in the record 'vhich the Respondent
believes to be i1nproper and immaterial. However, since
the Appellant has done this, Respondent feels constrained
to mention that at the tin1e that the Court 'vas
discussing the disposition of the case subsequent to the
hearing of the evidence (mentioned by Ap·pellant at
page 3 of his Brief) and at which time Appellant notes
a discussion with reference to Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah
2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977, that the Court specifically asked
the Appellant if he vvished to withdraw his Counterclaim. Counsel for the Appellant answered that he did
not wish to vvithdra'v the Counterclain1. The record before this court shows that the Counterclaim alleging
grounds for divorce in favor of Appellant and praying
for a divorce in his favor if .a divorce 'vere granted
furnished the foundation for Appellant's theory of his
case belovv. It is significant to note in this regard that
after counsel's summation and upon hearing that the
Court felt that a divorce was merited that Counsel for
Appellant moved the Court for a divorce in his favor
and for custody of the children. This motion will be
found at page 57 of the original transcript and is part
of the record before this court for the reason that the
stipulated narrative statement of testimony covers, af'Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cording to the stipulation of counsel, only the testimony
of witnesses. Thus, with or without the matter not
properly in the record, it is manifest that the Appellant
is now asking this Court to undo what he intentionally
did up.
It is a rule of long standing and of obvious merit
that a party cannot successfully complain of acts or
of error which he induced the court to commit or for
rulings \vhich he invited the trial court to make.
3 Am. Jur. Sec. 876.

This rule of estoppel applies equally to pleadings,
evidence, instructions, findings, judgments, and rulings
on motions.
3 .A.1n. Jur. Sec. 878, 879, S80, 882.

In Esse:r Packers rs. Kisecker. 373 Pa. 351, 95 A. 2d
5-t-t the court held that one ,,~ho had been granted a
new· trial upon his OW"Il motion would not be heard to
ron1plain that it "~as granted.
Thi~

eourt has held that "~here a person brought
up an i ~sue he ""ould not be heard to eo1nplain that the
court decided it.
Brou·n rs. Skeen. ~D lTtah 5GS~ 5S P. 2d 2±.

On the 1nntter of self-inYited error this eourt has
ru]Pd~ n~

is the unanilnous rule, that one will not be
lu).nrd to con1plain of instructions given at his request.
1\Tcl.\oo'On

l'S.

Lott, 81 lTtah 265, 17 P. 2d 272.
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Pett-ingill vs. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185.

Authorities supporting the proposition that one cannot change his theory of the case on appeal, complain
that he got that which he asked for, or in any material
manner take advantage of "self-invited error" are legion.
The necessity for this rule is obvious.
The appellant need not have alleged that grounds
existed in his favor, he need not have minutely examined
\vitnesses with reference to these specific grounds, he
need not have moved for a decree in his favor, he need
not have refused to withdraw his counterclaim when
given the opportunity by the trial court-but he did.
The .appellant could have asked for an amendment of
the court's findings, could have asked the court which
heard the case to grant him relief-he did not. Instead
he has waited until filing his brief on appeal, nearly
two years after the trial, to say "my pleadings were
in error, my elicited testimony is insufficient, my theory
of the c.ase was wrong, I now desire to change my mind."
To allow this would absolutely nulify the rules of law
calculated to maintain the sanctity and stability of judicial determination. That such is not to be done is elementary hornbook law. This court properly said in
Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Ut.ah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954)
that where a case is tried on one theory (and that theory
prevails) that that theory is the law of the case and that
the proponent of that theory will not be allowed to shift
his position and theory on appeal.
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Even assuming the a_ssertions of the Appellant correct with referrence to his reasons, i.e. that there is
insufficient evidence to support the findings in his favor,
he would not be heard to complain for even in cases
of actual error, he who induced such error cannot thereafter assert such error on appeal. This court said in
N~elson vs. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 P. 2d 272 (1932):
"Appellant complains of instruction No. 14,
for the reason that the same assumes that the
last chance doctrine is applicable. \\~e are inclined
to agree "~i th counsel, but as the instruction is
identical w·ith defendant's request Xo. 5, with the
exception of the words "exercising due care and
caution," appellant has no cause for complaint.
Re~!)Ondent

respectfully submits that the Court did
not err in the 1nanner suggested by ..._\_ppellant, and, a
fortiori~ there is IilOre co1npelling reason for not perInitting the . A.ppellant to "~ithdra"~ his pleadings, nor to
drnoulH.'P the eYidence he elicited in snr)port of his pleadin
nor to attack the finding-s of fact and conclusion8
nf la\\· Pntered thereon, nor to change his n1ind and
"·ithdra\\· hi~~ 1notion n1ade at the close of the trial that
n diYol'<'(\ he gT<1nted in his fa.YOI\ and .at this stage of
t h0 ntattPr, nea rl~· t\\. 0 yea r8 subsequent to the inception
ol' thi~ aetion and nt"\arly eighteen 1nonths subsequent
1o tltP granting of the interlocutor~· decree in his favor
and on hi~ n1otinn and "·ithout haYing in any 1nanner
nt tPntpt Pd to u~e~ let .alone exhaust~ his re1nedies before
t 1H\ t rinl eonrt, to InnkP the proposal that the trial court
prrPd hPeaU~<' it found in his favor and a.t his specific
1 .. :--; ~

,-......

1.._
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request and in accord with a theory of the case presented
by hin1 and followed by him at the trial.
Innumerable .authorities from all jurisdictions, without exception, support the rule here relied upon by Re.spondent. There is no foundation in either law, logic
or experience to support the request the Appellant makes
in his Point I. Cases concerning this type of issue occupy
page after page in the American Digest System, digested
under Appeal and Error, key numbers 882 (and its
numerous subdivisions) and 883.
A few of the cases representing the law 1n this
matter are:
In re Cla~tssenius' Estate, 96 c·.A. 2d 600, 216 P.
2d 485.
Staley vs. Fazel Bros., 247 Iow.a 644, 75 N.W. 2d
253 (Appellant could not complain of testimony elicited by his own cros.s-examination).
Schlecht vs. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 262 P. 2d 252.
Smith vs. City and County of San Francisco, 117

C.A. 2d 749, 256 P. 2d 999.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT APPELLANT'S POINT I, THE EVIDEN·CE SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT A DIVORCE SHOULD BE GRANTED, AND IF
THE COURT SEES FIT TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE
AWARDED TO APPELLANT AT HIS REQUEST IT IS
PROPER TO GRANT A DIVORCE IN RESPONDENT'S
FAVOR.
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Appellant takes the position that the evidence elicited fails to support the decree awarded him, stating
that it was incumbent upon him to show a more aggravated case than were he the wife, and that he did not,
and further that there is not sufficient evidence to support a decree in favor of Respondent.
Although it may appear somewhat inconsistent for
the Re.spondent to attempt to support the decree of
divorce granted Appellant, it is submitted by the Respondent that the more recent cases from this court
modify the earlier Utah cases cited by Appellant, and
that where it is apparent that the marriage is not salvageable that a divorce should be granted. It is clear
from the evidence that this marriage is now beyond
hope of reclammation. The enlightened policy of the
law in this respect i.s well founded on Utah decisions.

Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977.
Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ______ lTtah ______ , 257 P. 2d
366.
The case of Hyrup vs. Hyru.p, 66 lTtah 580, 245 P.
335, cited as authority for the proposition that a divorce
is not merited in the instant eontroversy, by the Appellant, is clearly not applicable. Th'is court pointed out in
Johnson vs. Johnson, 107 Utah 1-±7, 15~ P. 2d 426 at
427, that the evidence in the H yru p case revealed t,,~o
quarrels ove-r a period of several years. This is clearly
not the same as the instant case wherein the record
properly before this Court shows a long histor~T of friction, cruel treatment, excessive sexual den1ands, incon-
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sider.ation, and other deterioration of the marriage over
an extended period of time which even the sincere attempts of the parties and their marriage counselor were
unable to sur1nount. The trial court was correet in his
finding that grounds for divorce existed, and he was
correct in h'is conclusion of law that the marriage should
be terminated.
Two years have nearly elapsed since the institution
of these proceedings. During this time the parties have
lived apart. The evidence before the trial court convinced him that their marriage was destroyed and that
to force them to continue living as husband and wife
would be intolerable. He thus awarded the decree to
the p.arty who in his opinion was least at fault.
Although Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d
977 concerns itself with a pToperty distribution incident
to a divorce, the Court restated the correct rule of law
which is applicable to the instant case. The Court said
that when the purposes of matrimony had been destroyed
to the extent that further living together was intolerable
it was the court's duty .and prerogative to grant a divorce.

Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ____________ Utah ____________ , 257
P. 2d 366, is directly in point. The opinion in that case,
though short, is to the point and lucidly expresses the
law to be applied where both parties are at fault. Although there may be some instances where the court
of equity might be justified in refusing relief if both
parties are found at fault, it is explained that such a
doctrine ha.s no place where the charges are cruelty.
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Our statute does not limit the granting of a divorce to
a party not at fault. No good purpose could conceivably
be served by refusing to terminate the marriage which
has in fact been terminated by the Appellant's own
request by an interlocutory decree of divorce for a period
approaching two years.
It is assumed that the citation by Appellant at
page 7 of his brief to White vs. White, 281 P. 2d 745,
as .a Utah case and implying that it is declaratory of
Utah law is an inadvertant error. White vs. White i~
an Oklahoma case specifically concerned with an Oklahoma statutory provision not found in our statutory
law, .a pTovision in Oklahoma which allows the court,
in its discretion, to refuse to grant a divorce where
the parties appear to be in equal \vrong. This is not
the law of Utah.

Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ____________ Utah ____________ , 257
P. 2d 366.

Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418.
·However, if the Court feels that it should grant
the Appellant'.s request to be relieYed of the decree he
requested, it is but proper to .a''Tard a decree of divorce
to the Respondent. The evidence supports it, the findings of the trial eourt support it. Equity and fair play
would de1nand it.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT.
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The Appellant's second point is as poorly taken
as is his first. Again he resorts to statements not found
in the record by referring to Appellant's having gone
to Canada to bring the Respondent and the child back
to Utah in July of 1954 (Appellant's Brief, page 10).
The Respondent submits that there is no mention of such
a trip by the Appellant in the stipulated statement of
testimony. The statement on page 11 of Appellant'.s Brief
concerning the vasectomy is again not supported by
the record before this court. Appellant's statement of
fact that his work keeps him in Salt Lake City is .also
without foundation. The fact is that his employment has
caused him to travel considerably.
Appellant refers to Respondent's expressions of
intent to return to Canada as being the real nub of the
reason why Appellant should be granted custody of the
children. In reply it must be noted that there is no
showing that the Respondent is not a proper person
to have custody of the children. The trial court spe-cifically found the Respondent to be a fit and proper person
to have custody of the children, and the Appellant has
not seen fit to attack this finding (R. 21). Appellant's
fears, even if they were to be well grounded are insufficient grounds for this court to act upon, for the lower
court retained continuing jurisdiction in this matter and
his remedy would be available there if one is to be
given him.
The Respondent is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, regardless of her place of resi-
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dence (R. 30). Since the trial court has retained continuing juri.sdiction in this respect, it is there that the Appellant must first seek relief, if he merits it.
The Appellant insists that the trial court erred in
granting custody primarily to the Respondent. In this
assertion the Appellant 'is not _supported by the facts nor
by the applicable law. The welfare of the children is
the p·rimary, paramount and controlling consideration in
determining the question of custody of minor children.
Although they will be considered, of course, by the court
in arriving at its decision, the wishes and personal desires of the p.arents must yield to the welfare of the children.
2 Nelson on Divorce 167.

Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 383.
Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550.
In the recent case of Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d
273, 293 P. 2d 418, this court again stated the underlying principles applicable to a situation such as the
instant one. This Court affirmed the granting of a divorce to the counterclain1ing husb.and but a'varded the
custody of the child to the n1other subject to subsequent
review, the Court stating that the para1nount consideration was the welfare of the child.
The Appellant does not assert, nor can he, that the
Respondent is unfit to have the children. Though he
makes lukewarm suggestions that in his opinion the
children might be better off 'vith hin1, it is clear that his
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request for custody is prim.arily motivated by an understandable, but not legally controlling nor material personal desire vvhich doe.s not have as its p-rimary basis
a consideration of the welfare of his children, but of
his own personal preference.
It is of some interest to note that at pages 10 and
11 of his brief the Appellant expre.ssly declares the very
facts which he denies having sufficiently proved under
his Point I.
Again it may be noted that the trial court did not
find the Appellant completely faultless in this affair (R.
21).

In concluding argument on this point, Respondent
desires to point out that the Appellant contends that he
is virtually required to stay in Salt Lake City for economic re.asons. This i.s untrue for he is an experienced
trained geologist admittedly capable of earning $10,000
per year. Appellant asse-rts that at all stages of the proceedings he has opposed the divorce. His filing of a
Counterclaim, eliciting of evidence in support thereof,
his motion for a divorce in his favor, his failure to
complain, vvhen he had the opportunity to so do, to the
trial court, his refusal to withdraw his Counterclaim
when offered the chance, his long delay in asserting
this argument for the first time on ap·peal certainly
contradicts his assertion that he has at all stages opposed the divorce.
Thi.s marriage has been completely seve-red for only
slightly less than two years at this time. The Appellant
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speaks of equitable treatment. The Respondent respectfully submits that granting the prayer requested by Appellant would not only be manifestly contrary to the law,
but would also be of a grossly inequitable nature f.ar
exceeding any "inequity" asserted by Appellant. The
decree of the trial court was most fair in allowing the
App·ellant rights of visitation and of temporary custody
of the children. The law and the decree both allow his
petition for a change, if and when there are conditions
to merit it. The dissolution of his marriage is indeed
to be lamented, particularly where small children are
involved, but to continue the marriage, or to award
custody to the Appellant would be to re-infect and aggravate and not to cure and alleviate.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the record before this Court and
the law applicable thereto, the Respondent respectfully
prays that this Honorable Court deny the requests n1ade
by the Appellant, and that this court affirm the decree
of the lower court, or failing so to do th.at the divorce
decree be modified only to the extent of granting the
divorce to the Respondent.
Respectfully sub1nitted,

LEE W. HOBBS,
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent, Mary Gilchrist
· Curry
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